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Summary
complete modeling of faults at gate level for a fault —tolerant computer
is both infeasible and uneconomical. Functional Fault modeling is an approach
where units are characterized at an intermediate level and then combined to
determine fault behavior. This report is a preliminary study on the
applicability of Functional Fault Modeling to the FTMP. Using this model a
forecast of error latency is made for some functional blocks. This approach
may be useful in representing larger sections of the hardware and may aid in
uncovering system—level deficiencies.
Introduction
1
s
The complexity of a fault-tolerant computer makes it impractical to
exhaustively estimate its reliability parameters using a low level fault model
(1,2) A particular logic function may be implemented in different. forms as a
technology matures or seperate venders may select different yet equivalent
forms. Even in current MSI circuits, equivalent logic specifications are used
rather than detailed transistor representations. A higher level approach is
Functional Fault Modeling (3-5). In a Functional Model gates cease to be the
primitives in analysis. The whole hardware structure is partitioned into
functional primitives. The partitioning is based on many factors. Whatever
partitioning was used in the design process is usually the starting point for
functional fault modeling. Faults occuring internal to a partition propagate
to the outputs of the partition (all gate level faults will manifest as some
functional level faults). This mapping of faults is many to one thus making
functional level modeling potentially simpler.
If the technology is well understood then the functional model can be
made to accurately represent the partition both in range of behavior and in
statistical characteristics. A library of models can be developed including a
hierarchy of units (e.g., flip-flop models used to develope a counter model,
etc.). When the technology is not well understood-the functional modeling can
be done in a more conservative manner (6-11). All conceivable fault behavior
could be represented, then as actual behavior data becomes available the
functional model can be made more accurate.
Because of the highly redundant nature of the FTMP, it is difficult to
surface many of its faults during its normal operation. But FTMP behaves as a
fault secure circuit for most of the faults. Eventually when that ri
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portion of the circuit is exercised the fault affect propagates to the outputs
of the partition. Since we know the circuit structure it is easy to break an
existing functional primitive into smaller primitives and improve the .
 accuracy
of the model.
FACTORS INFLUENCING ERROR LATENCY
In FTMP, Error Latency is influenced by hardware and software. Faults on
an active single bus line are masked by the voters and except in the BGU's,
the error decoding circuits detect these errors.
Three primary factors influence error latency:
1. Whether the Faulty circuit is exercised,
2. The rate at which the error latches are read, and
3. Whether that part is influencing the detection circuitry.
Each of the above cases needs to be analysed carefully to arrive at an
accurate overall latency estimate.
1. The first factor is a natural consequence of the highly redundant
nature of the FTMP. If the fault occurs in an inactive region it is harmless,
but another fault at this juncture might cause abnormal behaviour. An example
of this is a fault on one of the spare buses as the first fault followed by a
fault on an active bus. This might result in replacing all the units enabled
on the faulty active bus by another faulty bus. Subsequent detection of the
second fault might take several cycles. It is imperative to activate
periodically all the redundant parts just to avoid long latency faults. Some
assumptions were made regarding exercising the redundant parts to arrive at a
(	 definitive figures for the error latency. The particular assumptions are
given later.
32. The second factor is software determined. A program called SCC
(System Configuration Controller) performs the chore of reading and
interpreting the error latches. The dispatcher directs SCC to the leastly
loaded triad. The first part of the program determines whether any errors
were reported in the preceding frame. It also determines whether the error
reported during a previous frame has been corrected. If not it waits for a
maximum of four cycles for the previous error to be corrected. An assumption
is made in this regard to make definitive forecasts.
3. Some parts like the BGUs do not have error detection circuitry.
Single faults here are often masked although all parts may be active. These
latent faults have to be dealt with specially. Normally there is no way to
propagate many of the single faults in the voting hardware and deskewers
unless we have another fault in such a way that they cooperate to cause
noticeable faulty output behaviour.
DESCRIPTION OF DETECTION PROCESS AT HIGH LEVEL
It may be recalled that all tasks run at one of the three preassigned
rates. The assumptions made in this paper regarding the rates are:
1. R1 rate is 3.125 hz (320 msecs).
2. R3 rate is 12.5 hz ( 80 msecs).
3. R4 rate is	 25 hz ( 40 msecs).
SCC, the high level fault handling program runs at R1 rate, i.e. every 320
msecs this program processes the error information supplied by hardware. SCC
also aids in surfacing the faults by running self testing programs and
activating spare units at regular intervals. We can summarize the fault
detection process as the arrival of disagreement at the voters of a triad,
stimulated by normal activity or test activity. Test activity includes self
4testing and spare cycling phases. The detection of faults initiates fault
identification and later reconfiguration. The identification and
reconfiguration is done with the help of special procedures initiated by
SCC. To have an accurate prediction of fault detection times, for various
faults it is important to know how the tasks constituting normal activity and
test activity are dispatched. The flow chart in Figure 1 explains SCCs
dispatching strategy at a high level. We see that test activity is dependent
on a parameter set in software (Time to Cycle). Whenever a swap command is
execut-d this parameter is initialised. In the current configuration Time to
Cycle will be true every S seconds. When this boolean value is true, spare
cycling is done. The purpose of test activity is to propagate the affects of
any faults in spare units to the error latches so that SCC detects them.
DESCRIPTION OF SELF TESTING IN FTMP
Self Test programs are run to detect some of the latent faults in error
latches, voters, error decoding circuitry, and cache PROMs of the FTHP. SCC
calls the master self test program .SELF-TEST) which in turn calls one of the
38 self tests. Each . self test is designed to test a specific unit and in each
run of SCC only one of the tests is invoked. The P, R, and T tests are
invoked if three corresponding bus lines are active. The C test is performed
if 4 clock lines are active. Essentially in P, R, T, and C tests a
disagreeing input stream is fed on one of the active lines and error latch
contents are checked to see whether the injected fault is reported. In PROM
test a checksum verification is made on different segments. To simplify the
analysis some assumptions were made regarding the self tests.
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ASSUMPTIONS ON SELF TESTS
As can be seen from flow chart in Figure 2 in some cycles SCC does not
invoke self tests. Since the rate of self testing is much larger than spare
cycling, it is assumed that self tests run periodically without interruption
from Spare Cycling. This will give estimates which are lower bounds on
average times. Based on this, the assumptions ST1 and ST2 are made.
ST1. Self tests are run at R1 rate, i.e., every 320 msecs.
ST2. Time to complete one cycle of self tests - 38 * 320 msecs - 12.160
secs. The order is given in Figures 2 and 3.
Occurrence of a fault is random with respect to the self test cycle. The
segmented testing employed makes the detection time vary between zero (when
occurrence of detectable fault is immediately followed by its detecting self
test) aad the time taken to complete the whole cycle (when the detecting self
test runs just prior to the occurrence of its detectable fault). ST3 follows
from the above.
ST3. Mean time to detection of any fault which can be detected in one
self test cycle - 38 * 320/2 - 6.08 secs, 	 s a.
e
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DESCRIPTION OF SPARE CYCLING IN FTMP
FTMP has processors, memories, and buses 1n , its spare pool. 'Units from
the pool can be brought on line to replace any failed active unit. To uncover
latent faults spares are periodically brought online even if all active units
are functioning correctly. Spares are assigned as shadows to active triads.
A shadow essentially duplicates the activities of the triad it is assigned to
track and differs from active units in its access priorities to the buslines
(e.g., a processor shadow cannot participate in polling, thus denying it
1
access to the transmit bus). But shadows watch the R and C bus lines to
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Schedule of Self Tests
1. Reset self test state.
2. POLL, ANY TRIAD, LOW ORDER
3. PROM, TRIADI, 1800
4. PROM, TRIAD2, 1800
5. PROM, TRIADS, 1800
6. R, TRIADI, LOW ORDER
7. R, TRIAD2, LOW ORDER
8. R, TRIADS, LOW ORDER
9. PROM, TRIADI, 1A00
10. T, TRIADI, LOW ORDER
11. T, TRIAD2, LOW ORDER
12. T, TRIADS, LOW ORDER
13. C, ANY TRIAD, LOWEST ORDER
14. POLL, TRIADI, MIDDLE ORDER
15. PROM, TRIAD2, lAQO
16. PROM, TRIADS, IA00
17. PROM, TRIADI, 1CQ0
18. R, TRIADI, MIDDLE ORDER
19. R, TRIAD2, MIDDLE ORDER
20. R, TRIADS, MIDDLE ORDER
21. PROM, TRIAD2, 1C00
22. T, TRIADI, MIDDLE ORDER
23. T, TRIAD2, MIDDLE ORDER
24. T, TRIAD3, MIDDLE ORDER
25. C, ANY TRIAD, 2ND LOW
26. POLL, TRIADI, HIGH ORDER
27. PROM, TRIAD3, 1C00
28. PROM, TRIADI, 1E00
29. PROM, TRIAD2, 1E00
30. R, TRIADI, HIGH ORDER
31. R, TRIAD2, HIGH ORDER
32. R, TRIAD3, HIGH ORDER
33. PROM, TRIAD3, 1E00
34. T, TRIADI, HIGH ORDER
35. T, TRIAD2, HIGH ORDER
36. T, TRIAD3, HIGH ORDER
37. C, ANY TRIAD, 2ND HIGH
38. C, ANY TRIAD, HIGH ORDER
Figure 3. Schedule of self test program units
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9maintain synchronism. To get them on-line, only the SGUs of the shadow and
the unit it is replacing have to be written into. SCC calls a procedure
ISSUE-SWAP-CNND to perform spare cycling. This is issued whenever Time to
Cycle is true (see flow chart). This procedure determines which spare unit
should be brought on-line and which unit it should replace. On each pass only
one spare unit is swapped. The order in which spare cycling is done is given
in Figure 4.
ASSUMPTIONS ON SPARE CYCLING
In the present system "Time to Cycle" is true every S secs in the absence
of reported faults. There is an interaction between spare cycling and
self testing because both of them cannot be done in a single cycle. Spare
cycling occurs at least twice in a cycle of self tests. Since the spare
cycling rate is much smaller in comparison to self testing, we assume both
self testing and spare cycling occur periodically without any interaction.
This will result in a more optimistic estimate or a lower bound on the
latency. Moreover the faults which can be propagated by spare cycling are
configuration dependent. Cycling changes inactive units, of a particular
configuration into active by changing the system configuration. This makes
the otherwise latent faults get detected in subsequent normal activity. The
swapping of processors and memories depends on the replacement policy.
Swapping of bus lines is easier to visualise as the maximum number of spare
bus lines of a particular type can be two. The following assumptions are made
regarding the rate and mode of spare cycling.
SCI. Spare cycling is done every S secs.
SC2. Spare cycling follows the order shown in Figure 4.
SC3. After the decision on which triad to issue swap command is made,
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the units are swapped using the LRU (Ltast Recenrty Used)
algorithm. Here the unit which will be used to replace is the
one which has been longest in spare pool for that triad and the
unit it will replace is the one which is active for the longest
time.
Figures Sa and Sb il' ,--trate this assumption as applied to processors and
buses respectively. We have illustrated the case of 12 pro , _asors with no•
failed processors or buses.
FAULT CLASSIFICATION
It is clear that SCC detectc many different types of faults and it uses
	
3
various programs to uncover then. Classification of faults is based on the
type of faults which mould be detsc*ed by a particular detection program.
Faults which go undetected are also classified. A level tree diagram (Figure
6) is given which descriLes the natur: and difficulty in 3etecting a fault.
Class 1: This corresponds to those faults which become visible during the
normal activity in the form of 'isagreement at voter propagated to
the error latches.
Class 2: Faults in redundant hardware, PROMs, error latches which do not show
up in normal activity belongs to this class. Self tests uncover
these faults.	 i.
Class 3: Faults in inactive units serving as spares belong to this class.
Spare Cycling uncovers these faults.
Class 4: Faults which go undetected.
a
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EXAMPLE TO DEMONSTRATE FUNCTIONAL FAULT MODELING
In this section we choose a specific unit for functional fault
modeliag. The procedure similar to this can be adopted to compute the fault
detection times for any other unit. A broad classification of the functional
misbehavior patterns of the unit in question is done. The classification
should be realistic in the sense that physical or logical gate level, faults
could produce that kind of functional misbehavior. After having defined the
misbehavior patterns one can categorize them into the fault classes discussed
in the previous sections depending upon how and when they set the system error
latches. To obtain the distribution of various faults amongst the fault
classes one has to identify the number of faults which result in a particular
misbehavior pattern. Then by exhausting all possible misbehavior patterns one
can obtain the resulting distribution faults belonging to each class. The
resulting distribution faults coupled with the assumptions of fault detection
software made in earlier sections can be used to obtain curves for fault
detection times.
We choose the 315 input-select unit given in Figure 7 which provides a
representative partitioning of the fault classes. This unit is present in all
the bus interfaces and BGU's. Its function is to select 3 out of 5 input
lines based on the 4 bit select code supplied by - the control register (see
Table 1). Regardless of the exact nature of implementation, the following
functional fault modeling approach can be taken.
MB1. Selects less than three active lines (assuming no duplication of
any active line).
MB2. Duplicated active line comprises two of the three active lines
selected.
-_ ,
	 wwa	 A-
Uri
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MB3. Faults which result in functional misbehavior only when the select
code or system configuration is changed ( faults here manifest as
MB1 or MB2 when configuration is changed).
MB4. Faults which cannot be detected.
Gate level faults can be maped into the above functional fault
classification.
Except for the BGU's, all other 3/5 select units are used in conjunction
with a voter—error ROM combination and MBi lines up with Class i. These
functional classes MBi will fall into the earlier overall fault classes
depending upon the location of the 3 / 5 select unit. If the select unit is
located in a spare then MB1, MB2, and MB3.are in Class 3, faults in inactive
units. When the select unit is in a BGU, MB1 falls into Class 2 which
requires special testing.
To illustrate the many to one mapping we take a specific implementation
of the 3/5 select (T BUS INTERFACE) and map the gate level faults to MB1, MB2, i°a
MB3, and MB4 (Classl, Class2, Class3 and Class4 respectively). 	 Some faults
are data dependent and mal	 o different fault behavior for different
implementations.	 To illustrate this, let the initial select code correspond
to lines 1, 2, and 4 being active. 	 Owing to some fault if 1, 3, and 3 are 4'
1
selected then clearly it falls to MB1 in say the T bus interface. 	 But if the
initial configuration changes from 1, 2, and 3 to 1, 3, and 3 due to a fault _	 =
then the fault falls to MB2. 	 The duplication of a line fora select code is
implmentation dependent.	 Therefore it is better to consider implementation
details to obtain a finer model.	 Assuming that all possible errors can occur^^
in the select code we tabulate the faults.	 Since the select code at a':^'s
particular instant of time is not known an averaging technique is used. 	 We
assume that all valid codes are equally likely.	 By this we get distribution
1
of select code faults into various classes (see Table 2).
Table 1
14
S3
Select
S2
Code
S1	 SO
For
A
U29
B
U30
A	 B Line 1 Line 2 Line 3
(SO) (S 1 S2) (S1)	 (S2)
0 0 0	 0 0 1 0	 0 4 2 1
0 0 0	 1 1 1 0	 0 5 2 1
0 0 1	 0 0 1 0	 1 4 3 1
0 0 1	 1 1 1 0	 1 5 3 1
0 1 0	 0 0 1 1	 0 4 3 2
0 1 0	 1 1 1 1	 0 5 3 2
0 1 1	 0 0 0 1	 1 2 5 4
0 1 1	 1 1 0 1	 1 3 5 4
1 0 0	 0 0 1 0	 0 3 2 1
1 0 0	 1 1 1 )	 0	 0 3 2 1
1 0 1	 0 0 1 y	 0	 1 3 3 1
1 0 1	 1 1 1
f
i	 0	 1 3 3 1
1 1 0	 0 0 1 1	 0 3 3 2
1 1 0	 1 1 1 1	 0 3 3 2
1 1 1	 0 0 0 1	 1 1 5 4
1 1 1	 1 1 0 1	 1 1 5 4
* Valid Codes
y
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INITIAL CODE # CLASS 1 #CLASS 2 # CLASS 3 # CLASS 4
0000 15 0 0 0
0001 15 0 0 0
0010 13 2 0 0
0011 13 2 0 0
0100 13 2 0 0
0101 13 2 0 0
0110 15 0 0 0
0111 15 0 0 0
1000 10 4 1 0
1111 14 0 1 0
Average
	
13.6	 1.2	 0.2	 0
Table 2. Select code input error behavior
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In a similar vein we can get distribution of input and output line stuck
faults. Here we assume that the select code is not faulty and faults manifest
on input and output lines. Faults assumed for input and output signal lines
are stuck-at-1, stuck-at-0 or inversion of the signal line. The number of
fault cases for each legal code is given in Table 3.
SELECT CODE # CLASS 1 # CLASS 2 #CLASS 3 # CLASS 4
0000 18 0 33 6
0001 18 0 33 6
0010 18 0 33 6
0011 18 0 33 6
0100 18 0 33 6
0101 18 0 33 6
0110 18 0 33 6
0111 18 0 33 6
1000 18 0 33 6
1111 18 0 33 6
Average	 18	 0	 33	 6
Table 3. Input or output faults
t:
r,^ ..,i
Q
17
Combining tables 2 and 3 we get the following distribution of faults:
Class 1	 43.88.
Class 2	 1.66%
Class 3	 46.11%
Class 4	 8.33%
Table 4.
Class 1 faults will be detected between 0-320 msec. Class 2 faults here would
require error-latch and voters self tests. Based on the assumptions made
earlier, the Class 2 faults will be detected between 0-12.16 sec.
Class 3 fault detection in the case of 3/5 select unit requires cycling
spare lines. From Figure 5b time between two bus swap commands is 140 secs.
This means that half of the Class 3 errors could be detected in a maximum time
of 140 secs and the rest after the next 140 secs. This case is plotted in
Figure 8.
we summarize the assumptions for Figure 8:
1. The faults are equally likely input select code errors and equally
likely bus input and select output stuck errors.
2. The select unit is not in a BGU but is equally likely to be any
other location.
3. Spare cycling and self-test run at their most frequent rate, i.e.,
the system is lightly loaded.
Triad I Triad 2 Triad 3
A	 123(10) 456(11) 789(12)
B	 10 2 3 (1)* 4 5 6 (11) 7 8 9 (12)
C	 1023 (1) 1156 (4)* 789(12)
D	 10 2 3 (1) 11 5 6 (4) 12 8 9 (7)*
E	 10 1 3 (2)* 11 5 6 (4) 12 8 9 (7)
F	 10	 1 3 (2) 11 4 6 (5)* 12 8 9 (7)
G	 10 1 3 (2) 11 4 6 (5) 12 7 9 (8)*
H	 10 1 2 (3)* 11 4 6 (5) 12 7 9 (8)
1	 10 1 2 (3) 11 4 5 (6)* 12 7 9 (8)
J	 10 1 2 (3) 11 4 5 (6) 12 7 8 (9)*
K	 1 2 3 (10)* 11 4 5 (6) 12 7 8 (9)
L	 1	 2 3 (10) 4 5 6 (11)* 12 7 8 (9)
M	 123(10) 456(11) 789(12)*
* Swap of shadow and active unit
Figure 5(a) Processor spare cycling assuming 12 processors.
One major cycle.
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Figure 5(b)
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a
Figure 7. Three out of five select unit (T Bus interface)
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Figure 8 Detection time for 3/3 select
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LATENCY
We next relal.e the functional fault classes and latency estimates of the
3/5 select unit to a system model. Faults have significantly different
effects on system behavior. For example a long latency fault in a nonactive
processor doesn't influence the system until it is reconfigured as an active
unit; but the failure of an active P bus line has immediate consequences.
Hence the functional fault classes ought to be of sufficient detail to allow
appropriate assignment to the various transitions in the system reliability
mods (e.g. Care III).
The classification used in arriving at Tables 2, 3, and 4 would be
applicable to an FTMP system reliability model which distinguished between
faults in active processors and memories and spare processors and memories.
But the classification is not of sufficient detail if BGU behavior is
explicitly included in Cae reelisbility model. Specifically the functional
behavior MB1 (selecting love than 3 active lines) should oe subdivided for the
BGU into the selection of 2 active lines and less than two active lines. The
BGU behavior differs for these two subcases.
Suppose the reliability model does distinguish between active processors
and spare processors, then the Classes in Figure 8 would probably be assigned
as follows:
1. Class 1 and Class 2 to transitions for a fault in an active
processor.
2. Class 3 to transitions for a fault in a spare processor.
3. Class 4 to reduce the occurence probability of a fault.
t
f
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MODELING PROCESS
The previous sections have attempted to illustrate the functional fault
modeling process when applied to a particular unit the estimation of fault
latency. The following factors are important in this modeling.
1. The detail known about the physical devices and structure of the
implementation and the possible fault mechanisms.
2. The hardware and softwere structure used to detect that a fault has
occurred. What redundancy exists in space and time and hose is it
used to detect faults.
3. The proposed use to be mdae of the latency estimates and the level of
detail about fault behavior that is required. For example. the
determination of worst case behavior.
.i
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